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1. Introduction 
To many people, pirates were only characters in legends or movies, before the emergence of 
piracy in the Strait of Malacca in 2000 and off Somalia in 2008. There have been pirate attacks 
in the high sea since the eighteenth century. Though it never completely subsided, it resurged in 
2000 in the Strait of Malacca with 112 attacks recorded (IMO, 2001), catching the attention of 
the maritime industry. It is estimated that vessels containing a third of global trade and two-
thirds of world’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade passing through the Strait of Malacca every 
year. The resurgence of pirate attacks forces the littoral states, including Singapore, Malaysia 
and Indonesia, to collaborate together to set up a series of countermeasures against piracy since 
2004. This includes a coordinated sea patrol initiative called MALSINDO, a joint air patrol 
military force called Eyes in the Sky and an Asian regional anti-piracy agreement called 
ReCAAP. These countermeasures successfully reduced the number of pirate attacks, with only 2 
incidents reported in 2009 (IMO, 2010a).  
While the piracy issue in the Strait of Malacca almost subsided, the number of attacks in the 
Somalia region, including Gulf of Aden, Coast of Somalia, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean, 
Coast of Oman, which were caused by Somali pirates, increases significantly. According to the 
International Maritime Bureau (IMO, 2010a), there were a total of 406 piracy attacks reported 
worldwide in 2009 and Somali pirates accounted for 217 attacks.  Since the attacks are well 
organized and sophisticated weapons such as rocket propelled grenade (RPG) were used, it 
caught the eyes of the world in the news headlines. International response to anti-piracy in the 
Somalia region has come from the naval military, shipping industry and land based programs 
led by the United Nations. However, there is no sign of a reduction in number, with 100 attacks 
reported in the Somalia region in the first half of 2010 (IMO, 2010b).  
Piracy issues affect international trade economically. Because of the high piracy risk of routing 
through the Gulf of Aden, insurance premium has increased 350 percent since May 2008. As a 
result, there was a 25 to 30 percent increase in freight rate (Kraska and Wilson, 2009). Besides, 
piracy risk also increases the vulnerability of vessel crew. In 2009, there was a total of 1052 
crew taken hostage with 68 injured and eight were killed (IMO, 2010a). After the September 11, 
2001 attack of the World Trade Centre in the U.S., international community realized that the 
situation can turn into a nightmare if pirate gangs connect with terrorist groups. Therefore, there 
is an urgency to call for effective countermeasures to reduce the risk of piracy in the high sea. 
This paper studies the successful factors as well as deficiencies of the countermeasures applied 
against piracy in the Strait of Malacca and the Somalia region. The piracy issues in the Strait of 
Malacca and the Somalia region are studied in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, respectively.  Chapter 4 
provides an anti-piracy framework and Chapter 5 compares the successful factors and 
deficiencies in combating piracy between the two cases.  
2. Piracy in the Straits of Malacca 
The Strait of Malacca lies between Peninsular Malaysia and Sumatra of Indonesia. It is an 800 
km long waterway connecting the Andaman Sea to the South-China Sea. The narrowest point of 
this shipping lane is only 1.6km in width. This creates a natural choke point with the potential 
for collision or grounding of a large vessel and the possible closure of the Strait. The waterway 
carries an annual commercial traffic of more than 50,000 ships, making it the world’s busiest 
waterway. The Strait also gives passage to more than a third of global trade and two-thirds of 
the world’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade. 
Piracy has existed in the Strait of Malacca for hundreds of years. Dating back to the end of the 
eighteenth century, the Sulu pirates attacked both coastal settlements and vessels and thousands 
of seafarers and coastal dwellers were enslaved by the raiders (Eklof, 2006). It resurged and 
peaked in 2000 (Figure 1), with reported attacks reaching 112. 
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It is believed that the Asian financial crisis of 1997 triggered people living in coastal villages 
along the Strait to resort to piracy to supplement their income (Raymond, 2009). The most 
common types of piracy attacks around this area are armed robberies and vessel hijacking. 
Kidnap-for-ransom type of attacks has emerged since 2000. The pirates take over the vessel and 
crews are held for ransom. They are usually released unharmed after ransom is paid. The 
ransom eventually paid range from US$10,000 to US$20,000 (Raymond, 2005). 
According to Bateman (2006), the majority of pirate attacks target smaller vessels employed in 
local trades, where these vessels are destined or originated at ports along the Strait. They are 
usually smaller, have lower freeboard and sail away from the main shipping channels. Therefore 
they are more vulnerable to pirate attacks. On the contrary, large vessels, such as large tankers, 
LNG carriers, large container vessels and vehicle carriers, employed for international trades that 
pass through the Strait are comparatively harder to attack unless they slow down, stop or 
anchor. However this traffic is of the most concern to the international community.   
After the September 11, 2001 attack of the World Trade Centre in the U.S., it is believed that 
pirate attack can be linked with terrorism. Littoral states of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore 
are pressured to deal with the issue. Three major countermeasures were introduced.  
 
 
Data source: IMO Annual Report 2000 (IMO, 2001), IMO Annual Reports 2001 (IMO, 2002), IMO Annual Report 2002 (IMO, 
2003), IMO Annual Report 2003 (IMO, 2004a), IMO Annual Report 2004 (IMO, 2005a), IMO Annual Report 2008 (IMO, 2009), 
IMO Annual Report 2009 (IMO, 2010a), IMO Report for the period of January to 30 June 2010 (IMO, 2010b) 
* Number of attacks up to end of June 2010 
Figure 1:  Number of piracy incidents in the Straits of Malacca from 1999 to 2010 
2.1 MALSINDO 
The first multilateral measure initiated by the three littoral states was a trilateral coordinated sea 
patrol called MALSINDO on 24 July 2004 (Roach, 2005). It involves the navies of the three 
littoral states patrolling in a coordinated fashion in their own territorial waters (Raymond, 
2009). The number of attacks dropped from 15 (IMO, 2004b) to 7, (IMO, 2004c) in the third 
quarter, compared with the number in the second quarter of 2004. However, it bounced back to 
16 in the fourth quarter (IMO, 2004d). Critics commented that the measure appeared to receive 
little success due to a lack of cross-border pursuit into each other’s territorial waters as a 
protection of infringement of sovereignty by each state (Roach, 2005), which created a haven 
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for the criminals who were able to escape into neighbouring state’s territory. On the other hand, 
the number of attacks in the first two quarters in 2005 decreased down to 5 and 7 (IMO, 2005b 
and 2005c), respectively.  
2.2  Eyes in the sky 
On 13 September 2005, the littoral states implemented another initiative, a joint air patrol called 
Eyes in the Sky (Ong, 2006), which was considered as one of the contributing factors to the 
decline of incidents. This joint air patrol permitted aircraft to fly above the territorial waters of 
the participating states and thus allowed foreign force to cross the border (Roach, 2005) as 
opposed to MALSINDO. The number of attacks further decreased to 3 and 1 in the third and 
fourth quarters of 2005 (IMO, 2005d and 2005e), respectively. However, there were some 
criticisms after the launch of this countermeasure mainly focusing on the insufficient capability. 
To cover the whole strait 70 sorties were needed in place; however, at that time there were only 
eight (Raymond, 2009). 
2.3  ReCAAP 
Asian Regional Anti-Piracy Agreement (ReCAAP), coming into force in 2006, was the most 
recent antipiracy imitative implemented by the three littoral states (Roach, 2005). This 
agreement involves all the members of the Association of Asian Nations and Japan, China, 
Korea, among others with an aim to foster multilateral cooperation among governments in 
combating the threat of piracy through the forms of information sharing, capacity building, 
coordinative surveillance, and facilitating respective countries’ law enforcement (Raymond, 
2009). This countermeasure encourages exchange of information, which facilitates criminal 
study among states, prevents and alerts other ships in the nearby territories to the incident, and 
facilitates states to use each other’s effort to construct a criminal combating network. IMO data 
shows that the number of attacks declined after all these countermeasures were implemented 
(Figure 1). It is hard to judge whether any of these countermeasures is more effective than the 
others, the decline of attacks due to the combination of all. 
3. Piracy off the Coast of Somalia 
The Gulf of Aden is a 900 km long and 500 km wide waterway situated between Yemen and 
Somalia. It connects the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. It is an essential transit 
avenue for transporting Persian oil between Europe and the Far East. There is approximately 3.3 
million barrels of crude oil per day, accounting for 12 percent of the world’s seaborne 
petroleum, and 22,000 ships per year pass through it to the Suez Canal (Siemens et.al., 2009). 
Vessels travelling from the Indian Ocean to the Suez Canal must pass through the often 
congested Strait of Bab el Mandeb. The Strait of Bab el Mandeb is divided into two narrow 
channels of 3 km and 25 km wide. In order to pass through this narrow choke point, ships need 
to significantly slow down, which increase their vulnerability to pirate attacks. 
Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world. According to World Bank, there are around 
43.2 % of the population, around 3 million people, living on less than one dollar a day in 2002 
(World Bank, 2003). It is divided into three autonomous regions of Somaliland, Puntland and 
Central Somalia. The country suffers from decades of violence and instability due to lack of an 
effective central government. It is ruled by a system of clans and the major piracy networks 
operate in the regions of Puntland, the most effected region with 1500 out of 2000 Somali 
pirates operating from Puntland (Hansen, 2009), Hobyo, Hardheere and Mogadishu. It is 
believed that piracy began in Somalia in response to illegal dumping of toxic waste off the coast 
and illegal fishing carried out by foreign fishermen in its territorial waters (Waldo, 2009). In 
retaliation, they began taxing these fishing vessels and gradually progressed to capturing crews 
and ransoming the vessels and thereby gaining experience in piracy operations. Currently the 
pirates attack all types of vessels from oil, energy tankers to container, bulk, general cargo and 
passenger cruise liners in return for huge financial rewards. A lack of central government and 
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pirates working in collusion with corrupted government officials of Puntland has facilitated the 
growth of piracy. It has also led to the formation of organized piracy gangs who are financed by 
warlords. Piracy operations in Somalia are well organized. It begins with information gathering 
from port and government officials regarding a ship’s route, crew, capacity, cargo, defense 
systems etc. Armed with this information they plan a coordinated attack using skiffs, more 
recently mother ships, ladders, hooks, RPGs which usually results in a boarding and takeover. 
Once the vessel is taken over, they force the crew to steer the vessel to a pirate mooring where 
they can get the provisions for themselves and their captives. The negotiation process follows 
which could last from days to months and ransom money of usually U.S. $2-$4 million is 
demanded. The ransom money is usually delivered to the hijacked vessels via boats and more 
recently being dropped from light aircraft from above. On receipt of the ransom, the hijackers 
take off and provide a safe passage for the vessel. According to reports from the captured 
pirates, the ransom is then divided among the pirates, their sponsors and the corrupted 
government officials. It provides a pirate several times the income earned by an average Somali. 
The apparent profitability of the business model along with a large pool of unemployed Somali 
men has increased the number of piracy gangs. Thus, the nature of piracy in Somalia is a highly 
planned and organized operation (Gilpin, 2009). 
 
 
Data source: IMO Annual Report 2006 (IMO, 2007), IMO Annual Report 2007 (IMO, 2008), IMO Annual Report 2008 (IMO, 2009), 
IMO Annual Report 2009 (IMO, 2010a), IMO Report for the period of January to 30 June 2010 (IMO, 2010b) 
* Number of attacks up to end of June 2010 
Figure 2:  Number of piracy attacks in the Somalia region, from 2002 to 2010 
 
IMO (2010a) reveals that the number of successful hijackings, attempted attacks and crews 
taken hostage has increased in 2009 compared to the figures from 2008 (Refer to Figure 2). In 
the first half of 2010, there have been 100 incidents of piracy attacks in the Somalia region. 
Piracy and maritime crime off Somalia poses threats to international seaborne trade, especially 
international oil trade. It directly impacts the importing and exporting countries around the area. 
It is predicted that the traffic through Suez Canal will be reduced if the issue keeps escalating. 
According to Siemens et.al. (2009), insurance premium for vessels travelling through the Gulf 
of Aden has increased 350% since May 2008. For vessels travelling around the Cape of Good 
Hope to avoid piracy risks in the Gulf, there is an extra annual fuel cost of around U.S. $3.5 
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million. As such, there is a 25 to 30 percent increase in freight rate. International response to 
anti-piracy in Somalia region has come from the naval military, shipping industry and land 
based programs led by the UN.  
3.1  International taskforce 
After the September 11, 2001 attack of the World Trade Center in US, a multinational 
Combined Task Force 150 (CTF150), led by U.S., was established. Naval forces from the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Denmark, France, Pakistan, India, Iran, Russia and other 
countries are patrolling the area. These patrols have had limited success because CTF 150 was 
operating under counterterrorism authority, they were not specialized in anti-piracy operations. 
Therefore CTF 150 has been unable to prevent most attacks. Moreover, once pirates 
successfully board and hijack a ship, they take the crew hostage and threaten to sink the vessel, 
limiting options by on-scene warships to rescue the crew and free the vessels. In January 2009, 
CTF 151 was created by the US Fifth Fleet, which is dedicated solely to confronting maritime 
piracy.  
Other than CTF150 and CFT151, various nations who use the passage also provide naval forces 
in patrolling the area. European Union Naval Force Somalia (NAVFOR) deployed its ships to 
actively fight against piracy in the area since December 2008. After the MV Semlow, a vessel 
chartered by the UN for transporting food relief to Somalia, was hijacked on June 27 2005, all 
shipments transporting humanitarian aids were suspended by the United Nations World Food 
Programme (ENS, 2005).  In November 2008, UN requested the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) for providing escorts to the food relief vessels going to Somalia. Last but 
not least, Japan, China, Russia and South Korea have also sent navies to provide escort services 
to their own flagship vessels in the high-risk waters.  
Somalia has the longest coastline in Africa. The area suffered from piracy risks spread across a 
very large area of around two million square miles of sea. In order to provide a more effective 
patrolling service, an International Recommended Transit corridor (IRTC) was set up to provide 
safe movement for ships in the high risk area since 2009. Vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden are 
recommended to transit through the corridor. 
3.2  United Nations Security Council Resolutions  
According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which came 
into force in 1994, vessels are only allowed to pass the territorial water of a coastal nation in an 
expeditious and continuous manner (innocent passage). In other words, international warships 
are not allowed to patrol within the territorial waters of Somalia. Because Somalia lacks an 
effective central government, there is no coast guard patrolling within its territorial waters and 
this became a haven to the pirate gangs. In view of this, in June 2008, the United Nations 
Security Council, which was notified by the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia 
(TFG), adopted Resolution 1816, which authorized a naval vessel to undertake ‘all necessary 
measures’ to combat piracy and armed robbery within the territorial waters of Somalia. Naval 
vessels are allowed to treat Somalia’s territorial waters as if they were international waters for 
the purpose of repressing piracy. Later in December of the same year, Resolution 1851 was 
passed to authorize UN’s member states to conduct anti-piracy operations involving attacks on 
land or by air in Somalia if approved by the TFG. 
3.3  The Djibouti Code of Conduct 
In January 2009, organized by the IMO, a high-level meeting of 17 States from the Western 
Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea areas, was conducted. The Djibouti Code of Conduct 
concerning the repression of piracy in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden was 
signed by the participating states (IMO, 2009). It recognizes the extent of the problem of piracy 
and armed robbery against ships in the Somalia region. Similar to ReCAAP, it is a cooperative 
agreement between littoral states to enhance piracy information sharing. Piracy information 
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exchange centers will be established in Tanzania and Yemen. An anti-piracy training centre will 
be set up in Djibouti. The effects of these anti-piracy countermeasures are yet to be seen. The 
number of piracy attacks in 2009 as well as the first half of 2010 is still high. However, the 
success rate of attack reduced to around 20 percent in 2009. 
4. A maritime security framework for fighting piracy 
Because of the resurgence of piracy attacks worldwide, there is an urgency for the international 
community to develop efficient and effective countermeasure to combat piracy in the high sea. 
By studying the piracy situations and ways of combating the issues in the Strait of Malacca and 
the Somalia region, an anti-piracy framework which can help to maintain a safe and secure 
maritime environment for commercial shipping is developed.  
4.1  An anti-piracy framework 
In general, the affected area can be categorized into land, territorial waters and international 
waters. Littoral states should provide effective legislation and prosecution regarding piracy 
activities conducted on land and the territorial waters. International support is important to 
improve the capacity of littoral states in fighting piracy. It is extremely important when littoral 
states are too weak to combat piracy. It is also important for international user states working 
together to provide a safe and security maritime environment for merchant shipping. Figure 3 
shows the anti-piracy framework. 
4.1.1  Responsibilities of littoral states 
Littoral states that have sovereignty on the land and territorial waters have direct impact on the 
success of anti-piracy countermeasures. Their efforts in fighting piracy are more efficient and 
effective. This can be seen from the success of anti-piracy countermeasures set up by the littoral 
states in the case of Malacca Strait. Littoral states should combat piracy by legislation and 
prosecution. Laws concerning piracy conducted in its territorial waters as well as on nationals 
who conducted piracy related crime in any international waters should be established. Land 
bases of pirate gangs should be traced and completely destroyed by inland police force. Pirates 
caught should be prosecuted according to the laws of the littoral state. In addition, coast guards 
should be organised by the littoral state to ensure the security of its territorial waters. However, 
the success of these contributions is affected by the geographic location as well as the incentives 
and capacity of combating piracy of the littoral states. The size and geographic location of the 
land and the territorial waters affect the capacity, in terms of both financially and 
technologically, needed to combat piracy.  
The volume of import and export trade of a littoral state directly influences its incentive in 
combating piracy. If the economy of the state is highly dependent on import and export trades, 
which is the livelihood of the state, the incentive of combating piracy in its territorial water is 
high. It will also influence its incentive in maintaining a safe and secure environment with 
international partners in the international waters. On the other hand, the economic status of the 
littoral state will directly affect its capacity and incentive on combating piracy in its territorial 
waters. If the economy of the littoral state is poor, there is poverty and political instability in the 
state, combating piracy will not be its first priority, it will be more reluctant to spend money and 
effort in combating piracy. 
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Figure 3:  An anti-piracy framework 
4.1.2  Cooperation between littoral states 
The success of the countermeasures applied in the Strait of Malacca is partly due to the regional 
cooperation among littoral states. However, strong regional concern over sovereignty, which 
prevents across border enforcement, makes it easier for criminals to escape from pursuit. 
Cooperation between littoral states can actually increase the capacity of combating piracy 
financially and technologically. Coordination in anti-piracy operations between littoral states 
can optimize the use of resources and naval forces. In addition, innovative technologies can be 
shared between littoral states to combat piracy more effectively with less resource. On the other 
hand, the success of ReCAAP is largely due to the exchange of information, which facilitates 
criminal study among states, which prevents and alerts other ships in the nearby territories to the 
incident, and facilitates states to use each other’s effort to construct a criminal combating 
network. 
4.1.3  International responsibilities 
The most direct international response is to provide naval forces to patrol in the high sea and 
escorting vessels passing through vulnerable area. In the case of the Somalia region, anti-piracy 
actions highly rely on international forces. Naval forces from the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Denmark, France, Pakistan, India, Iran, Russia and other countries provide CFT150 
and CFT151 to patrol the area. NAVFOR, NATO and individual countries, such as Japan, 
China, Russia, South Korea, among others also send their navies to escort vessels that flying 
their own flag and provide assistance when requested by vessels flying flag of other countries. 
This is especially useful when the littoral states are too weak to combat piracy around the area. 
According to the 2009 annual report of IMO (2010a), these naval forces successfully stopped 
some of the attacks in the Somalia region. However, these international joint forces are limited 
in the international waters only. Any anti-piracy operations will not be successful without the 
involvement of the littoral states. Therefore, when the littoral states are too weak to provide 
sufficient capacity in fighting piracy, financial and technical support from international 
community is crucial. When there is poverty and political instability in the littoral states, they 
have enough problems in their own hands and there are other issues more important for them to 
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solve, it is normal that they do not have the incentive to combat piracy. Financial and technical 
support can help reduce the burden and increase their incentives to solve the piracy issue. The 
international community can also put pressure on littoral states, even when their incentives in 
doing so are low. In the case of the Strait of Malacca, littoral states, such as Indonesia and 
Malaysia, were reluctant to take on full gear on the piracy issue. However, after pressures 
coming from international user states and the effort from Japan and other countries in pulling 
the littoral states together, the three littoral states including Singapore successfully combated 
piracy issue in the area.  
4.1.4  Ocean carriers and ship owners 
The model will not be complete without the involvement of the ocean carriers and ship owner 
which use the passages. Analysis of all failed piracy attempts of the Somalia region reveals that 
the large majority of attacks were unsuccessful due to the efforts of merchant ships themselves. 
In the Gulf of Aden, even with presence of coalition patrols, 65% of attacks were foiled by 
preventive measures taken by merchant ships whereas in the Indian Ocean, which is rarely 
patrolled, it is 96% (Refer Figure 4). With low probability of timely naval help, it is imperative 
that the merchant ships adapt self protective measures. Also, analysis of in cases of successful 
hijackings reveals that the hijacked ships had inadequate planning and procedures in place, were 
proceeding at a low speed, in low state of alert and therefore slow to respond. Low free board 
and lack of protective measures is another common factor among successful hijackings. Based 
on the above analysis, IMO recommended Best Management Practices would be the best 
defense (IMO, 2010d, 2010e and 2010f ).  
4.1.4.1  Before voyage 
It is suggested that the shipping companies should review their ship security plans, ensure that 
anti-piracy measures are included, before the voyage. It should be exercised, briefed and 
discussed with the master and the ship security officer. Crew members are drilled with the 
security plan before the voyage and the entering of the risk area such that they are fully aware of 
the risks involved during attacks by pirates or armed robbers and the company’s actions upon 
attack. Besides, shipping companies should maintain an accurate record, including identity, next 
of kin and medical conditions of each crew member.  
4.1.4.2  During voyage 
Watch-keeping should be arranged all the time during voyage. When entering the high risk area, 
additional lookouts should be arranged to increase vigilance. Crew members are drilled again 
with the contingency plan before entering the area. The ships transiting through the region 
should inform and register with the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), the Maritime 
Security Centre, Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) and the Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO). They 
should only use the IRTC while transiting through the Gulf of Aden. Night passage through 
high risk areas is the safest as statistically very few attacks have succeeded at night. Liaison 
with Naval forces, such as UKMTO, MSCHOA and MARLO is needed. A speed of over 18 
knots is currently recommended by the IMO for preventing pirates from boarding. 
4.1.4.3  Preventing boarding 
Small speed open boats are commonly used by pirates for approaching from either quarter or the 
stern of the vessel being attacked. Lightweight ladders are then used to climb up the side of the 
vessel. Self-protective measures, such as water spray and foam monitors can be used to prevent 
pirates from approaching the vessel. Besides, razor wire and anti-climb paint is effective from 
preventing pirates from climbing up the vessel. Electrified fence can also be used, however, 
warning signs must be provided. In fact, interviews from captured pirates reveal that they find it 
very difficult to board a ship with effective water hosing (Hansen, 2009). It is also 
recommended that zigzag manoeuvre makes the boarding of pirates difficult. Crew members 
who are not involved in anti-piracy measures should be mustered in safe musters.  
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4.1.4.4  When boarded 
If the vessel is boarded by pirates, all crew members should try to muster in safe musters. 
CCTV should be installed in musters such that crew members can monitor the situation. 
Moreover the ships should also give an immediate emergency mayday call and activate Ship 
Alert System and Automatic Identification System so that it can be tracked in any event. It is 
recommended that firearm should not be used as it can provoke the pirates. Sudden movements 
around pirates should also be avoided as this exposes crew members into danger.  
4.1.4.5  After the incident 
The shipping company and the ship master should report to UKMTO, MSCHOA and IMO after 
the incident. Reviews on the company’s emergency plan should be done. 
5. A comparison of the two cases 
In light of the anti-piracy framework provided in chapter 4, we would like to investigate the 
successful factors and deficiencies in the countermeasures applied in the Strait of Malacca and 
the Somalia region. 
 
 
Source: (IMO, 2010a) 
Figure 4:  Prevented attacks in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean in 2009 
5.1  Root cause 
It is believed that the Asian Financial crisis of 1997 triggered people living along the coastal 
area of the Strait of Malacca to engage in piracy activities to supplement their income. The 
poverty of Somalia is quite another story. After the collapse of Siad Barre regime in 1991, there 
was no government in charge and the economy and infrastructure of the country were 
devastated. As there was no governmental protection of the fishing waters, fishing resource 
which is the main source of living for coastal communities for generations were exploited by 
foreign companies, which put the livelihood of coastal people in danger. Table 1 shows the 
percentages of population suffering from poverty of the littoral states of the Strait of Malacca 
and the Somalia region. It can be seen that the poverty situations in the littoral states in the 
Somalia region are much more serious than those in the Strait of Malacca. Most of the littoral 
states have more than 40% of the population living below two U.S. dollar a day. The situation in 
Somalia is much worse than the others. 
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Table 1 Percentages of population suffering from poverty 
 
Population living below 
$1.25 a day (%) 
Population living 
below $2 a day (%) 
Population living below the 
national poverty line (5) 
Indonesia 7.1 (2007)  60 (2007) 2.9 (2004) 
Malaysia 0.5 (2004) 7.8 (2004)  - 
Singapore -   -  - 
Djibouti 5.3 (2002) 41.2 (2002)  - 
Kenya 6.1 (2005) 39.9 (2005) 16.6 (2006) 
Somalia 43 (2002)#  -  - 
Yemen 4.2 (2005) 46.6 (2005) 13.8 (1998) 
Source: (World Bank 2009) 
# Source from (World Bank 2003) 
5.2  Nature of piracy 
Most of the pirate attacks in the Strait of Malacca are in the form of robbery and focus on small 
vessels and barges with simple weapons such as pistol. In contrast, kidnaps and hijacks 
dominate the piracy issue in Gulf of Aden and the pirates target on oil tankers and bulk vessels 
with sophisticated weapons such as RPG. Even at its peak, piracy in Malacca accounted for 75 
incidents in 2000 which sharply reduced in subsequent years as regional countries focused their 
resources. Presently, it is more of opportunistic armed robbery with limited incidence of 
hijacking and that too mostly limited to small crafts and tugs (Raymond, 2009). In contrast the 
pirates originating from Somalia vary from small family teams to organized criminal gangs, 
with multimillion dollar revenues; they aim to hijack large ships for ransom and are in collusion 
with corrupted government officials. It has a viable business model and financial sponsorship 
mechanisms promising high rate of return (Gilpin 2009, Hansen 2009). These robust, intelligent 
and evolving gangs cannot be countered by the weak anti-piracy capacity of the littoral states. 
Unlike piracy in Malacca which reduced substantially when the patrolling was set in place, the 
piracy off Somalia has actually increased and spread out from Gulf of Aden, engulfing most of 
the West Indian Ocean after the international navies started anti-piracy operations in 2008. 
5.3  Geographical factor 
The geographical situations of these two areas are not the same either. As is shown in Figure 5, 
the Strait of Malacca is a relatively narrow waterway which is easy for the littoral states to 
patrol along, while the Gulf of Aden, in contrast, is vast open waters which make the full patrol 
coverage of the area impractical and impossible.  
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Source: (IMO Live Piracy Map, 2010) 
Figure 5:  Map of Somalia and Straits of Malacca 
 
The international forces have tried to reduce the patrol areas by implementing International 
Recommended Transit Corridor in Gulf of Aden. While 60 ships are required to fully patrol 
IRTC; at most 25 to 30 ships are available at any one time. Considering that it takes around 15 
minutes to hijack a ship, if naval forces are not in close proximity, by the time they arrive it is 
already too late. The patrolled area is only a fraction of the total affected area. According to an 
estimate it would take hundreds of naval ships to fully patrol such a large area (Tharoor, 2010) – 
a force that can never be assembled even by world maritime powers let alone the regional states.   
When countries around Malacca signed Regional Cooperation Agreement on combating piracy, 
being located at the borders of the affected strait, they were able to establish joint reporting and 
patrolling mechanisms. On the other hand, regional countries around Somalia not located 
around the area and are more spread out and hence constrained by long geographical distances 
from the piracy affected region. 
5.4  Littoral states 
In this section, economy and political situation of the littoral states of the two areas are 
discussed. Export and import trades of the littoral states are also studied as an indicator of their 
incentive in fighting piracy in their territorial waters. 
5.4.1  Economy 
It is shown in Table 2 that all littoral states in the Somalia region seriously suffered from 
poverty, most of them depend on UN aids. Therefore, their motivation for regional cooperation 
may only be the small investments expected out of the bargain. Table 2 shows the GDP of each 
littoral state. The littoral states of the Strait of Malacca are much wealthier, their GPD level are 
10 times more than the littoral states in the Somalia region. It explains that the littoral states of 
the Strait of Malacca can afford to provide large scale naval supports and high technological 
countermeasures. On contrast, the littoral states in the Somalia region have limited capability 
that they can only afford a few low endurance gunboats.  
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Table 2:  GDP of the littoral states of Straits of Malacca and Somalia region 
 
GDP (billions) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Indonesia 256 286 365 432 511 
Malaysia 124 138 156 187 222 
Singapore 110 121 139 167 182 
Djibouti 0.67 0.71 0.76 0.82 0.88 
Kenya 16.1 18.74 22.5 27.12 30.35 
Somalia - - - - - 
Yemen 13.87 16.75 19.08 21.66 26.58 
 
5.4.2  Political 
In case of the Strait of Malacca, the regional countries have authority on their lands to establish 
law and order and to apprehend, prosecute and punish pirates. On the other hand, in the Somalia 
region, all piracy stems from Somalia where its Transitional Federal Government has almost no 
control over areas where the pirates are based. Most of piracy originates from Puntland which is 
an autonomous region governed by a system of clans. Here the corrupted authorities actually are 
considered to collude with the pirates (Hansen, 2009). This forms a hindrance on international 
support. Since there is no central authority ruling the country, it is difficult to know who to 
support in order to improve the littoral states’ capacity on anti-piracy operations. When a pirate 
is caught, no government enforces the law and prosecution. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
identify the political party has the power and authority to coordinate with neighbouring states.   
5.4.3  Incentive in fighting piracy 
Table 3 shows value of import and export goods and services compare with GDP of each littoral 
state. It can be seen that import and export activities in the littoral states in the Strait of Malacca 
are important contributors to the country’s economy. In the case of Singapore, the value of 
import and export goods and services equals to 200% of its GDP. Singapore port is famous for 
transshipment and one of the main contributors to the country’s economy. However, in the case 
of the Somalia region, import and export trades are comparatively lower. In the case of Somalia, 
there are barely import or export activities, except international food aids, in the country for the 
last two decades. This explains that the littoral states in the Strait of Malacca have higher 
incentive to maintain a safe and security environment in their territorial water because it directly 
affects the economy of these countries. 
5.5  International supports 
In the case of the Strait of Malacca, littoral states are strong economically and are highly 
motivated as import and export trades directly affect their economy. Therefore, they don’t need 
a high level of support internationally. The role of international support is less significant than 
the case in the Somalia region. International community acts as facilitators to enhance 
collaborations between littoral states and provide technical advices. On the other hand, littoral 
states in the Somalia region are much poor and they have lower incentives to combat piracy as 
import and export have less influence in the country’s economy. In this case, anti-piracy 
countermeasures highly rely on international supports. Littoral states are relying on UN’s aids to 
fight with poverty. They don’t have enough capacity to fight with piracy, even though they are 
willing to, with the necessary technical and financial support from international states.  
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Table 3:  Import and export goods and services compare with GDP 
  
Import Export 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Indonesia 28 30 26 25 29 32 34 31 29 30 
Malaysia 95 95 94 90 - 115 117 117 110 - 
Singapore 199 208 213 198 215 224 236 243 230 234 
Djibouti 54 51 58 80 - 37 41 40 59 - 
Kenya 33 36 36 37 41 27 29 26 26 27 
Somalia - - - - - - - - - - 
Yemen - - - - - - - - - - 
 
Conclusions 
This paper studies the piracy issues in the Strait of Malacca and the Somalia region. From the 
two cases and the anti-piracy framework, we can see that involvements of the littoral states are 
the primary drivers of success in combating piracy. However, geographical and economical 
factors affect the incentive and capacity of the littoral states in the fight of piracy. Local 
cooperation can optimize the use of resources, and hence, improve countermeasures capacity. 
Without a strong local anti-piracy capacity, international community needs to put extra effort in 
combating the issue with a less effective outcome.  
References 
Bateman, S. (2006) Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Strait, Maritime Studies, 
May-June 2006, 20-23.  
Eklof, S. (2006) Pirates in paradise: a modern history of Southeast Asia’s maritime 
marauders, NIAS Press, Denmark. 
ENS (2005). Food Relief Ship to Somalia Hijacked, UN Suspends Aid, Environment News 
Service, Nairobi, Kenya, July 7. Retrieved: 5 October 2010, from FACTIVA database. 
Gilpin, R. (2009) Counting the costs of Somali piracy, Unites states institute of peace working 
paper, pp. 4-15. 
Hansen, S.J. (2009) Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden, Norwegian Institute of urban and 
regional research, vol.29, 1-70. 
IMO (2001) Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships - Annual Report 2000, International 
Maritime Organization, London, UK. 
IMO (2002) Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships - Annual Report 2001, International 
Maritime Organization, London, UK. 
IMO (2003) Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships - Annual Report 2002, International 
Maritime Organization, London, UK. 
IMO (2004a) Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships - Annual Report 2003, International 
Maritime Organization, London, UK. 
A maritime security framework for fighting piracy 
Ng 
 
14 
IMO (2004b) Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships – Second Quarterly Report 2004, 
International Maritime Organization, London, UK. 
IMO (2004c) Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships – Third Quarterly Report 2004, 
International Maritime Organization, London, UK. 
IMO (2004d) Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships – Fourth Quarterly Report 2004, 
International Maritime Organization, London, UK. 
IMO (2005a) Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships - Annual Report 2004, International 
Maritime Organization, London, UK. 
IMO. (2005b) Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships – First Quarterly Report 2005, 
International Maritime Organization, London, UK. 
IMO (2005c) Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships – Second Quarterly Report 2005, 
International Maritime Organization, London, UK. 
IMO (2005d) Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships – Third Quarterly Report 2005, 
International Maritime Organization, London, UK. 
IMO (2005e) Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships – Fourth Quarterly Report 2005, 
International Maritime Organization, London, UK. 
IMO (2006) Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships - Annual Report 2005, International 
Maritime Organization, London, UK. 
IMO (2007) Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships - Annual Report 2006, International 
Maritime Organization, London, UK. 
IMO (2008) Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships - Annual Report 2007, International 
Maritime Organization, London, UK. 
IMO (2009) Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships - Annual Report 2008, International 
Maritime Organization, London, UK. 
IMO (2009) Protection of Vital Shipping Lanes Sub-Regional meeting to conclude 
agreement on maritime security piracy and armed robbery against ships for States from 
Western Indian Ocean , Gulf of Aden and Red Sea Areas, International Maritime 
Organization, C 102/14, London, UK. 
IMO (2010a) Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships - Annual Report 2009, International 
Maritime Organization, London, UK. 
IMO (2010b) Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships - Report for the period 1 January 
to 30 June 2010, International Maritime Organization, London, UK.  
IMO (2010c) Live Piracy Report 2010, International Maritime Organization, London, UK. 
Retrieved: 7 June 2010, < http://www.icc-ccs.org/> 
IMO (2010d) Piracy and Armed Robbery against - Guidance to shipowners and ship 
operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed 
robbery against ships, International Maritime Organization, MSC.1/Circ.1334, London, UK 
A maritime security framework for fighting piracy 
Ng 
 
15 
IMO (2010e) Guidance for company security officers (CSOs) – Prepartion of a company 
and crew for the contingency of hijack by pirates in the western Indian Ocean and the 
Gulf of Aden, International Maritime Organization, MSC.1/Circ.1390, London, UK 
IMO (2010f) Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy off the Coast of Somalia in the 
Arabian Sea Area Developed by the Industry, Witherby Seamanship International Ltd
Ong, G.G. (2006) The threat of maritime terrorism and piracy, Regional Outlook, January, 12-
16. Retrieved: 25 May, 2002, from ABI/INFORM Global. 
, 
Scotland, UK. 
Raymond, C.Z. (2005) Malacca Strait: A High-Risk Zone, Maritime Studies, July-Aug 2005, 
18-19.  
Raymond, C.Z. (2009) Piracy and armed robbery in the Malacca Strait - a problem solved, 
Roach, J.A. (2005) Enhancing maritime security in the Strait of Malacca and Singapore, 
Journal of International Affairs, vol. 59, no. 1, 97-117. 
Naval War College Review, vol. 62, no. 3, 31-42. 
Siemens, R.L. Pollack, J.P. and Freiheit J.L. (2009) Piracy’s Impact on Insurance, Risk 
Management, vol. 56, no. 7, 38-43. 
Tharoor, I. (2010) As Patrols Increase Somali Pirates Widen Their reach, Times Magazine, 
Retrieved:15 May 2010,< http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1984473,00.html  >. 
Waldo, A.M. (2009) The Two Piracies in Somalia: Why The World Ignores The Other, 
Wardheer News, Retrieved: 20 May 2010, <http://wardheernews.com 
/Articles_09/Jan/Waldo/08_The_two_piracies_in_Somalia.html>. 
World bank (2003). Socio Economic Survey 2002 - A report prepared under the Somalia 
Watching Project. Retrieved 27 September 2010, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/> 
